# Lab: `secretsmanager_policy_overbroad` b2b_saas / medium / `enterprise-vault` · prod ## Your job Production database credentials are stored in AWS Secrets Manager. Can a principal outside this account read the secret itself? For each path, name where it starts, what opens the way, and what the attacker reaches. That is not always data: it can be a role, a key, a secret, an image, a queue, a snapshot or a database. ## Resources - `n02_7994/acct-main`: **Account** prod-account-7994 - `n16_7994/acct-external`: **Account** external-account-7994 - `n20_7994/sec-db-creds`: **SecretsManagerSecret** prod-db-master-credentials-7994 - `n07_7994/rds-prod-primary`: **RdsInstance** prod-postgres-primary-7994 - `n24_7994/data-prod-db-records`: **DataSet** production-database-records-7994 - `n04_7994/s3-partner-inbox`: **S3Bucket** partner-upload-inbox-7994 - `n23_7994/role-batch-service`: **IAMRole** BatchServiceRole-7994 - `n00_7994/pol-batch-service`: **IAMPolicy** BatchServicePolicy-7994 - `n10_7994/role-release-audit`: **IAMRole** ReleaseAuditRole-7994 - `n17_7994/pol-release-audit-read`: **IAMPolicy** ReleaseAuditReadPolicy-7994 - `n18_7994/role-partner-sync`: **IAMRole** PartnerSyncRole-7994 - `n25_7994/pol-partner-sync-read`: **IAMPolicy** PartnerSyncReadPolicy-7994 - `n21_7994/s3-release-downloads`: **S3Bucket** release-downloads-7994 - `n11_7994/s3-ops-runbooks`: **S3Bucket** ops-runbooks-7994 - `n05_7994/trail-ops-runbooks`: **LogTrail** trail-ops-runbooks-7994 - `n12_7994/data-ops-runbooks`: **DataSet** runbook-library-7994 - `n22_7994/s3-audit-evidence`: **S3Bucket** audit-evidence-7994 - `n09_7994/trail-audit-evidence`: **LogTrail** trail-audit-evidence-7994 - `n01_7994/data-audit-evidence`: **DataSet** audit-evidence-files-7994 - `n19_7994/s3-app-config`: **S3Bucket** app-config-store-7994 - `n06_7994/trail-app-config`: **LogTrail** trail-app-config-7994 - `n15_7994/data-app-config`: **DataSet** app-config-values-7994 - `n14_7994/sqs-audit-events`: **SqsQueue** audit-events-7994 - `n08_7994/s3-telemetry-logs`: **S3Bucket** telemetry-logs-7994 - `n13_7994/ecr-analytics-worker`: **EcrRepository** repo-analytics-worker-7994 - `n03_7994/sqs-metrics-queue`: **SqsQueue** metrics-queue-7994 ## Relationships - `n16_7994/acct-external` --can_read--> `n20_7994/sec-db-creds` - `n07_7994/rds-prod-primary` --stores_sensitive_data--> `n24_7994/data-prod-db-records` - `n16_7994/acct-external` --can_read--> `n04_7994/s3-partner-inbox` - `n23_7994/role-batch-service` --attached_policy--> `n00_7994/pol-batch-service` - `n23_7994/role-batch-service` --can_read--> `n20_7994/sec-db-creds` - `n10_7994/role-release-audit` --attached_policy--> `n17_7994/pol-release-audit-read` - `n18_7994/role-partner-sync` --attached_policy--> `n25_7994/pol-partner-sync-read` - `n11_7994/s3-ops-runbooks` --logs_to--> `n05_7994/trail-ops-runbooks` - `n11_7994/s3-ops-runbooks` --stores_sensitive_data--> `n12_7994/data-ops-runbooks` - `n22_7994/s3-audit-evidence` --logs_to--> `n09_7994/trail-audit-evidence` - `n22_7994/s3-audit-evidence` --stores_sensitive_data--> `n01_7994/data-audit-evidence` - `n19_7994/s3-app-config` --logs_to--> `n06_7994/trail-app-config` - `n19_7994/s3-app-config` --stores_sensitive_data--> `n15_7994/data-app-config`
This estate was prebaked. A unique copy composes on the server in about 20 ms from a scenario spec: 10,000 seeds per family, 15 families. No cloud account was touched; the graph is the source of truth.
The grade is one call to TypeSafe Jev: three yes/no questions (entry, hop, sink) and one depth score (0 to 3, fewer rungs on a short path), typed probabilities back. No grade yet on this page.
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